Making Sense of \u3ci\u3eSchaumberg\u3c/i\u3e: Seeking Coherence in First Amendment Charitable Solicitation Law by Inazu, John D.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 92
Issue 3 Spring 2009 Article 5
Making Sense of Schaumberg: Seeking Coherence
in First Amendment Charitable Solicitation Law
John D. Inazu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
John D. Inazu, Making Sense of Schaumberg: Seeking Coherence in First Amendment Charitable Solicitation Law, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 551
(2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol92/iss3/5
 MAKING SENSE OF SCHAUMBURG: 
SEEKING COHERENCE IN FIRST 
AMENDMENT CHARITABLE SOLICITATION 
LAW 
JOHN D. INAZU

 
The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in a trilogy of cases in the 
1980s: Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1980), Secretary of State of Maryland v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co. (1984), and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina  
(1988).  Owing largely to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, 
and commercial speech emerging during that era, the Court failed to articulate a coherent 
framework for evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The result has left the Court without 
a clear rationale for the value of charitable solicitation and lower courts without a workable test for 
evaluating regulations affecting this form of speech: the Eighth and Tenth Circuits interpret 
Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test, the Third and Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict 
scrutiny test, and the Fourth Circuit has simply noted that the Court has been “unclear” about the 
appropriate standard. 
After examining the Court‟s approach to charitable solicitation, I propose a new test that 
incorporates current notions of content analysis and tiered scrutiny and better accounts for the 
speaker-based interests tied to charitable solicitation.  My normative approach adopts a “civic 
conception of free speech” that is cognizant of the matters of public concern advanced both directly 
and indirectly through charitable solicitation.  I conclude that a balancing of interests offers a more 
appropriate review of charitable solicitation regulation than the cumbersome formulations arising 
out of the Schaumburg trilogy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in a 
trilogy of cases in the 1980s: Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment,
1
 Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,
2
 and 
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina.
3
  Owing largely 
to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and 
commercial speech emerging during that era, the Court failed to articulate a 
coherent framework for evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The 
result has left lower courts unable to judge ―the ends which the several rules 
seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up 
to gain them, and whether they are worth the price.‖4  The Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits interpret Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test, the Third and 
Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict scrutiny test, and the Fourth Circuit has 
simply noted that the Court has been ―unclear‖ about the appropriate standard. 
The lack of doctrinal coherence has also left an important form of speech 
without adequate First Amendment protections. 
My objective in this Article is to articulate a framework for reviewing 
charitable solicitation regulation that better accounts for the important 
democratic values of this kind of speech.  This requires understanding the 
relationship between charitable solicitation and related First Amendment 
concepts.  I begin by reviewing the state of three of these concepts—content 
analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech—when the Court decided 
Schaumburg in 1980.  In Part III, I review the Court‘s charitable solicitation 
decisions.  Part IV proposes an alternative test to that constructed under the 
 
1. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
2. 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
3. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 
110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1007 (1997). 
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Schaumburg-Munson-Riley trilogy.  My normative approach accounts for the 
speaker-based interests related to charitable solicitation and builds upon a 
―civic conception of free speech‖ that better ensures ―broad communication 
about matters of public concern‖ advanced both directly and indirectly 
through charitable solicitation.
5
  I contend that a balancing of interests rooted 
in a concern for democratic discourse offers a more principled and more 
cogent review of charitable solicitation regulation than the cumbersome 
formulations applied today. 
II.  CONTENT ANALYSIS, TIERED SCRUTINY, AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Content analysis
6
 and tiered scrutiny
7
 emerged independently of one 
another in First Amendment law.  The latter originated in the equal protection 
context: by the early 1970s, commentators had observed that the Court 
applied strict scrutiny to classifications that were suspect or involved a 
fundamental interest while subjecting all other statutes to a ―standard of 
minimal rationality.‖8  Because speech was deemed to be a fundamental 
liberty interest under the First Amendment, the Court evaluated regulations of 
most forms of speech under strict scrutiny.
9
 
 
5. CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 19, 28 (2d ed. 1995). 
6. Government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral when justified without 
reference to the content of speech.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  
Whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral is not always readily discernible.  See 
Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-
Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 809 (2004) (―[T]he distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral laws is too amorphous to serve as a determinative test of 
constitutionality.‖); see also Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (the use of content distinction is ―both theoretically questionable and 
difficult to apply‖); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar 
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 107 (1978) (―[S]ince content-neutral, like 
content-based, restrictions may at times have a differential impact or reflect a latent government 
hostility toward certain ideas, the differences between these two types of restrictions often seem to be 
differences more of degree than of kind.‖). 
7. See United States v. Playboy Entm‘t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (strict scrutiny); 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (intermediate scrutiny). 
8. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (―The Warren Court embraced 
a rigid two-tier attitude.  Some situations evoked the aggressive ‗new‘ equal protection, with scrutiny 
that was ‗strict‘ in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential ‗old‘ equal protection 
reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.‖). 
9. The Court made an important distinction in 1942 when it clarified that categories of speech 
were either protected or unprotected.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).  
Regulations of speech in the latter category were of little constitutional concern.  Id. (―[S]uch 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.‖); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (1st ed. 
1978) (―From the dictum in Chaplinsky the Supreme Court had gradually derived what became 
known as the two-level theory of the first amendment, recognizing speech at one level as fully 
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As the Court assimilated tiered scrutiny into its First Amendment 
doctrine, it limited its application of strict scrutiny to regulations that 
discriminated based upon the content of speech.  This distinction first 
appeared in the 1972 decision Police Department of City of Chicago v. 
Mosley, which involved a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing or 
demonstrating on a public way within 150 feet of any school but exempting 
―the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.‖10  Mosley 
challenged the ordinance on equal protection grounds, and the Court rejected 
the City‘s distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing.11  
Regulations based on content were ―never permitted‖12 and would be 
subjected to a high degree of scrutiny.
13
 
Contemporaneously with Mosley, the Court reconsidered its two-fold 
regime of strict and rational basis scrutiny.  Writing of the 1971 Term that 
included Mosley, Gerald Gunther suggested that there was ―mounting 
discontent‖ with two-tiered scrutiny and that the Court was prepared to 
intervene in some circumstances with something less than strict scrutiny.
14
  
Gunther presaged that an ―intensified means scrutiny would, in short, close 
the wide gap between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the 
minimal scrutiny of the old not by abandoning the strict but by raising the 
level of the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.‖15 
 
entitled to first amendment protection and relegating to a lower level speech so worthless as to be 
beyond the constitutional ken.‖). 
10. Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972).  Stephen Gottlieb contends that 
Mosley ―reinterpreted [past] cases in terms of the obligation of government to remain neutral with 
respect to the content of speech.‖  Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and the Limits of 
Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REV. 19, 24 (1986). 
11. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94. 
12. Id. at 99.  Noting that ―the equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with 
First Amendment interests,‖ the Court concluded that ―[t]he central problem with Ch icago‘s 
ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.‖  Id. at 95, 99. 
13. Kenneth Karst has observed that Mosley marked the Court‘s first full acknowledgment that 
a content-based regulation was particularly odious because it violated ―the principle of equal liberty 
of expression . . . inherent in the first amendment.‖  Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central 
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26 (1975).  Karst contends that ―[t]he 
absence of a clear articulation of the principle of equal liberty of expression in Supreme Court 
decisions before Mosley may be attributable to a belief that the principle is so obviously central 
among first amendment values that it requires no explanation.‖  Id. at 29. 
14. Gunther, supra note 8, at 12. 
15. Id. at 24.  Several years after Gunther‘s article, the Court began extending a lesser degree of 
scrutiny toward speech regulations that it concluded were not based on content.  In Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court noted that it had ―often 
approved‖ time, place, and manner restrictions ―provided that they are justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so 
doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.‖  425 U.S. 
748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added).  The term ―content-neutral‖ also entered the Court‘s lexicon.  See 
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to a ―content-neutral 
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Gunther‘s prediction of an emerging intermediate scrutiny was consistent 
with the adumbrations of the Court‘s 1968 decision in United States v. 
O‟Brien.16  O‟Brien, a case involving ―expressive conduct,‖ announced a 
previously unseen standard of review: 
 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if 
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest.
17
 
 
Writing about O‟Brien in 1975, John Hart Ely commented: ―[T]he Court 
is surely to be commended for here attempting something it attempts too 
seldom, the statement of a coherent and applicable test.‖18  But Ely observed 
that O‟Brien‘s language revealed an ambiguity in the Court‘s strict scrutiny 
test.
19
  Prior to O‟Brien, strict scrutiny review upheld a speech regulation only 
if there were no ―less restrictive means‖ available.20  Ely noted that this phrase 
could be either strongly or weakly construed.
21
  Strongly construed, the test 
would invalidate almost any regulation because, as Justice Blackmun 
observed four years later, ―[a] judge would be unimaginative indeed if he 
could not come up with something a little less ‗drastic‘ or a little less 
‗restrictive‘ in almost any situation.‖22  Weakly construed, some regulations 
would survive review.
23
 O‟Brien substituted the phrase ―no greater than is 
 
time, place, and manner restriction‖); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (same). 
16. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
17. Id.  This new test was consistent with the jurisprudential developments in equal protection 
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503–04 
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971). 
18. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975).  Ely foreshadowed a 
broad applicability of the new test, observing that O‟Brien‘s standard was ―not limited to cases 
involving so-called ‗symbolic speech.‘‖  Id. 
19. According to Ely, the fourth prong of O‟Brien‘s test ―involves a choice between different 
conceptions of [the ‗no greater than is essential‘] standard, a choice made by reference to factors 
neither O‟Brien nor any other Supreme Court decision has yet made explicit.‖  Id. 
20. Id. at 1484–85. 
21. Id. 
22. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979)  (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
23. Ely wrote that ―this weak formulation would reach only laws that engage in the gratuitous 
inhibition of expression, requiring only that a prohibition not outrun the interest it is designed to 
serve.‖  Ely, supra note 18, at 1485. 
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essential‖ for ―less restrictive means‖24 and upheld the defendant‘s criminal 
conviction for violating a speech regulation.
25
  Ely concluded that the analysis 
and result were consistent with the weak formulation of strict scrutiny.
26
  He 
suggested that this weak formulation ―turned out to be no protection at all,‖ 
and he equated O‟Brien‘s review to rational basis scrutiny.27  Here, his 
otherwise trenchant analysis was exaggerated.  The plain language of O‟Brien 
indicated something beyond minimal scrutiny.
28
  The case signaled the 
emergence of an intermediate standard of review that was less than strict 
scrutiny but greater than rational basis review.
29
 
Although the Court initially failed to classify O‟Brien as an intermediate 
scrutiny test, it tightened its strict scrutiny definition in two First Amendment 
decisions issued the year after Ely‘s article, supplanting the settled ―less 
restrictive means‖ with the previously unseen ―least restrictive means.‖30 The 
slight language shift ensured that the Court‘s strict scrutiny test was no longer 
vulnerable to the weak formulation that Ely had exposed. 
 
24. See United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
25. Id. 
26. ―Further language in the O‟Brien opinion, and the holding of the case, indicate that [the 
weak formulation] is the strongest form of less restrictive alternative analysis in which, under the 
circumstances, the Court was prepared to engage.‖  Ely, supra note 18, at 1485. 
27. Id. at 1486 n.18. 
28. In 1984, the Court characterized O‟Brien as ―little, if any, different from the [intermediate 
scrutiny] standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.‖  Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797–98 
(1989). 
29. A similar development was evolving more explicitly in the Court‘s equal protection 
analysis.  A 1977 Note in the Harvard Law Review observed that ―[m]any commentators ha[d] noted 
the emergence from the Supreme Court of an intermediate standard of scrutiny in equal protection 
analysis, more deferential than the ‗strict scrutiny‘ exercised in challenges to suspect classifications 
and classifications impinging on fundamental rights, but more exacting than the ‗rational basis‘ test 
traditionally applied to economic and social welfare legislation.‖  Note, Intermediate Standard of 
Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 177, 177 (1977).  Although this intermediate scrutiny in equal protection 
analysis was strikingly similar to the new O‟Brien standard for expressive speech jurisprudence, the 
Court had not yet linked the concepts when it decided Schaumburg. 
30. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (―Though there is a vital need for government 
efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least restrictive means for 
fostering that end.‖); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (―[D]isclosure requirements—certainly 
in most applications—appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign 
ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist‖).  Buckley and Elrod were the Court‘s earliest 
uses of the phrase ―least restrictive means.‖  Three years later, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. 
Socialist Workers Party, the Court asserted that it had previously ―required that States adopt the least 
drastic means to achieve their ends.‖  440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979).  The Court supported this somewhat 
apocryphal claim by citing two previous decisions: Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974), and 
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31–33 (1968).  Rhodes contained no discussion about the burden 
that a regulation could place on a protected interest.  Lubin noted that a ―legitimate state interest . . . 
must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden . . . an . . . important 
interest.‖  415 U.S. at 716.  Neither case supported the principle that strict scrutiny required the ―least 
drastic means.‖ 
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Ely observed that O‟Brien‘s crucial inquiry was its second prong—
whether the governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.
31
  A regulation that failed to satisfy this prong was not per se 
unconstitutional, but the Court‘s analysis would be ―switched onto another 
track.‖32  That other track was strict scrutiny.33  The conclusion that a 
regulation related to the suppression of free expression (i.e., a content-based 
regulation) required strict scrutiny was the same conclusion that Mosley had 
reached.
34
  But Mosley had failed to distinguish O‟Brien‘s more relaxed test 
from strict scrutiny.  Ely clarified the distinction by inferring not only the 
connection between content-based regulation and strict scrutiny but also its 
converse: content-neutral regulations were subject to something less than 
strict scrutiny.
35
  The Court, however, had not yet adopted the term 
―intermediate scrutiny,‖ and the litmus for content-neutrality had not yet 
become whether a regulation was unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.
36
  Ely‘s analytical prescience about the link between content-
neutrality and intermediate scrutiny likely went unrecognized because the 
relevant descriptive terms were not yet embedded in the Court‘s vernacular. 
The terminology, however, was close at hand.  In 1978, Laurence Tribe 
observed that ―[w]here government aims at the noncommunicative impact of 
an act [i.e., when the regulation is not content-based], the correct result in any 
particular case thus reflects some ‗balancing‘ of the competing interests.‖37  
Several months later, Geoffrey Stone, in the first of three articles that tracked 
the development of the Court‘s content analysis doctrine in the 1970s and the 
1980s, explained that ―[g]overnmental restrictions of expression may be 
divided into two general categories—content-neutral restrictions and content-
based restrictions.‖38  Stone observed that the Court subjected content-based 
restrictions of ―fully protected‖ expression to ―a stringently speech-protective 
set of standards‖ and upheld such regulations ―in only the most extraordinary 
circumstances.‖39  Conversely, the Court reviewed content-neutral restrictions 
with ―a balancing of first amendment interests against competing government 
 
31. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484. 
32. Id.  Tribe uses the ―track‖ terminology in his analysis of communication and expression.  
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 580–688. 
33. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484. 
34. Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). 
35. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484. 
36. The Court clarified the latter in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
37. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 581.  Tribe traces the roots of the academic debate between 
absolutist protection and balancing to the early 1960s.  See id. at 582–83 n.19. 
38. Stone, supra note 6, at 81.  The other two articles are Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983), and Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). 
39. Stone, supra note 6, at 82. 
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concerns.‖40  Thus, only two years before the Court‘s landmark charitable 
solicitation decision in Schaumburg, commentators had zeroed in on the 
emergence of an intermediate scrutiny balancing test for content-neutral 
regulations of protected speech. 
One other emerging concept affected the context in which the Court 
examined Schaumburg: commercial speech analysis, ―a notoriously unstable 
and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence.‖41  Since its 1942 
decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court had viewed commercial 
speech as unprotected.
42
  In the mid-1970s, the Court reversed this 
classification in two decisions, Bigelow v. Virginia
43
 and Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
44
  After Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy, the Court protected commercial speech, but the degree of 
that protection remained unclear because commercial speech was not ―wholly 
undifferentiable from other forms‖ of speech.45  As Justice  Powell elaborated 
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‟n: 
 
To require a parity of constitutional protection for 
commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite 
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the 
Amendment‘s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of 
speech.  Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a 
devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a 
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its 
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, 
while allowing modes of regulation that might be 
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
46
 
 
Commercial speech, then, although within the realm of First Amendment 
protection, was something less than fully protected speech.  The distinction 
created a conundrum.  Under the old two-tiered scrutiny, the Court subjected 
 
40. Id. at 81; see also Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A 
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 762 (1980) (Review of content-neutral regulation ―consists of a 
middle-tier equal protection test, similar to that used in cases of discrimination on the basis of gender 
or illegitimacy, coupled with a controlled balancing test.‖). 
41. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 
(2000). 
42. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (―[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as 
respects purely commercial advertising.‖), overruled by Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
43. 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). 
44. 425 U.S. 748, 780 (1976). 
45. Id. at 771 n.24. 
46. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
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regulation of protected speech to strict scrutiny and regulation of unprotected 
speech to rational basis scrutiny.  With the advent of content analysis, the 
Court applied a form of intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulation of 
protected speech.  But what about content-neutral regulation of commercial 
speech?  No longer unprotected, commercial speech merited something other 
than rational basis scrutiny.  But because commercial speech was not ―wholly 
undifferentiable‖ from other forms of protected speech, it did not warrant the 
same degree of protection as these other forms. 
III. THE CHARITABLE SOLICITATION CASES 
The appearance of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and a new 
understanding to commercial speech during the 1970s provided the context in 
which the Court formulated its approach to charitable solicitation in 
Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley.  I now turn to these cases. 
A. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
Schaumburg addressed a city ordinance that prohibited door-to-door or 
on-street solicitation by an organization that did not use at least 75% of 
donations for ―charitable purposes.‖47  The Village of Schaumburg offered 
three justifications for its regulation: policing fraud, protecting public safety 
and protecting residential privacy.
48
  The Court concluded that the ―legitimate 
interest‖ in preventing fraud ―[could] be better served by measures less 
intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation,‖49 and found no ―substantial 
relationship‖ between the 75% requirement and the protection of public safety 
or residential privacy.
50
  The village‘s interests were thus only ―peripherally 
promoted‖ by the limitation and ―could be sufficiently served by measures 
less destructive of First Amendment interests.‖51  Although the Court never 
 
47. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 622–23 (1980).  The 
ordinance regulated ―peddlers and solicitors,‖ who were defined as ―any persons who, going from 
place to place without appointment, offer goods or services for sale or take orders for future delivery 
of goods or services.‖  Id. at 622 n.1.  The Court devoted the bulk of its analysis to the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine and held that the Village‘s ordinance was unconstitutionally 
overbroad.  Id. at 635.  The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine traces its roots to Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE 
L.J. 853, 863 (1991).  The doctrine permits someone whose conduct may be legit imately proscribed 
to challenge the proscription as it applies to others.  Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634; see Fallon, supra, 
at 863–67.  Because overbreadth is an ―ancillary‖ doctrine that comports with the Court‘s more 
substantive doctrines like content analysis, see id. at 866–67 (citing David S. Bogen, First 
Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679, 681 (1978)), Schaumburg‘s principles are 
applicable outside the overbreadth context. 
48. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636, 638. 
49. Id. at 637. 
50. Id. at 638. 
51. Id. at 636. 
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synthesized these observations in Schaumburg, its underlying test might be 
formulated as follows: 
 
A direct and substantial regulation of door-to-door or on-
street charitable solicitation will be sustained if it serves 
sufficiently strong, subordinating interests by means of 
narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests 
without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment 
freedoms.
52
 
 
Four months after Schaumburg, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice 
Blackmun, asserted in his dissent in Carey v. Brown that Schaumburg had 
articulated a content-neutral intermediate scrutiny test.
53
  At least one lower 
court reached the same interpretation that year,
54
 as did Professor Stone in an 
article published three years later.
55
 
B. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. 
Four years after Schaumburg, the Court revisited restrictions on charitable 
solicitation in Munson.
56
  The Maryland statute at issue in Munson, like the 
Schaumburg ordinance, limited the percentage of charitable solicitations that 
charities could spend on fundraising costs.
57
  The statute, however, covered 
any ―fund-raising activity‖ rather than simply door-to-door and on-street 
solicitation.
58
  The plaintiff, a professional charitable solicitor, asserted that 
the statute violated his rights to free speech and assembly.
59
 
 
52. This phrasing is derived from Stone‘s characterization of Schaumburg‘s test.  See Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50. 
53. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 476–77 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 
Schaumburg for the proposition that the Court ―has upheld state authority to restrict the time, place, 
and manner of speech, if those regulations ‗protect a substantial government interest unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression‘ and are narrowly tailored, limiting the restrictions to those reasonably 
necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest‖). 
54. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of Houston, 620 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App. 1981) 
(citing Schaumburg for the notion that ―[r]easonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of the 
exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights will be upheld if they are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech and are narrowly drawn, limiting the restrictions to 
those necessary to protect significant governmental interests‖). 
55. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 245 (intimating that 
the ordinance in Schaumburg was a content-neutral, speaker-based restriction). 
56. Sec‘y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
57. Id. at 950.  Unlike the Schaumburg ordinance, the Maryland statute included a discretionary 
provision under which the Secretary of State could license a charity whose fundraising expenditures 
exceeded the statutory cap if enforcing the cap would ―effectively prevent the charitable organization 
from raising contributions.‖  Id. at 962. 
58. Id. at 950 n.2.  In addition to door-to-door solicitation, any ―fund-raising activity‖ 
presumably encompasses solicitation ranging from telemarketing to newspaper advertisements.  At 
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Munson relied heavily on Schaumburg.  Justice Blackmun explained for 
the Court that the government restriction in Schaumburg had not been ―a 
precisely tailored means‖ and had borne ―no necessary connection‖ to the 
Village‘s asserted interests.60  Because these phrases, absent from 
Schaumburg, were not strict scrutiny terms, it appeared that Munson was 
cryptically endorsing Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test.  But 
Munson then cited Schaumburg for the strict scrutiny proposition that certain 
statutes would be invalidated if they ―[did] not employ means narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.‖61  Schaumburg had 
asserted that a restriction had to be ―narrowly drawn‖62 but had never used the 
strict scrutiny phrase ―narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.‖  Munson thus recharacterized Schaumburg‘s test as akin to strict 
scrutiny,
63
 approximating the following: 
 
A direct and substantial regulation of charitable solicitation 
will be sustained if it furthers a compelling governmental 
interest, and if the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest and does not unnecessarily interfere with First 
Amendment freedoms.
64
 
 
Following Munson, a federal district judge,
65
 a federal appellate judge,
66
 
and the Supreme Court of Maine
67
 cited Schaumburg for the strict scrutiny 
principle that a regulation must be the ―least restrictive means‖ available to 
accomplish a legislative purpose, a strict scrutiny interpretation that exceeded 
even Munson‘s recharacterization of Schaumburg.  Conversely, Stone, in an 
 
least one of the governmental interests in Schaumburg, protecting public safety, fails to justify 
restrictions on these other forms of fundraising. 
59. Id. at 950, 952. 
60. Id. at 961. 
61. Id. at 965 n.13. 
62. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980). 
63. Like Schaumburg, Munson never addressed whether the Maryland regulation was content-
neutral or content-based. 
64. This formulation approximates the standards articulated or implied by Munson. 
65. See Hornstein v. Hartigan, 676 F. Supp. 894, 897 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Schaumburg for 
the principle that even a compelling interest ―must be drawn with the least restriction on First 
Amendment freedoms‖). 
66. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350, 359 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing Schaumburg in the context of strict scrutiny for the principle that a 
state ―must demonstrate that [a] regulation is ‗the least restrictive means available that would 
accomplish the legislative purpose‘‖). 
67. See State v. Me. State Troopers Ass‘n, 491 A.2d 538, 542 (Me. 1985) (citing Schaumburg 
for the principle that a law ―must be narrowly drawn so that it is the least restrictive means of 
achieving the compelling government interest‖). 
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oft-cited article on content analysis, adhered to his earlier assessment that 
Schaumburg articulated an intermediate scrutiny test for a content-neutral 
regulation.
68
  The confusion stemming from the convergence of tiered scrutiny 
and content analysis in evaluation of charitable solicitation regulation was 
becoming evident. 
C. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc. 
Four years after Munson, the Court examined three provisions in the 
North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act, which directly regulated 
professional charitable solicitors.
69
  Turning first to a requirement that the 
percentage of contributions retained by professional charitable solicitors be 
―reasonable,‖ Justice Brennan began by reviewing Schaumburg and 
Munson.
70
  Justice Brennan noted that Munson had applied ―exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny,‖71 and concluded that Schaumburg and Munson ―teach 
that the solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech, and that 
using percentages to decide the legality of the fundraiser‘s fee is not narrowly 
tailored to the State‘s interest in preventing fraud.‖72  The Court held that the 
reasonable fee provision was unconstitutional under this standard.
73
 
Addressing next a requirement in the statute that professional solicitors 
make certain disclosures, Justice Brennan abruptly concluded that the 
provision was a content-based regulation because ―[m]andating speech that a 
speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the 
speech.‖74  This perfunctory conclusion was the first time that the Court had 
explicitly applied content analysis to a charitable solicitation regulation.  
Justice Brennan then noted that ―North Carolina‘s content-based regulation 
[was] subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.‖75 
 
68. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50.  Stone considered 
Schaumburg to correspond to a test of intermediate scrutiny under which ―the Court takes seriously 
the inquiries into the substantiality of the governmental interest and the availability of less restrictive 
alternatives.‖  Id. at 52.  Under this intermediate standard of review, ―the government cannot satisfy 
the less restrictive alternative requirement merely by demonstrating that less restrictive measures 
would serve its ends ‗less effectively‘ than the challenged regulation.  Rather, to withstand 
intermediate scrutiny, the government must prove that its use of a less restrictive alternative would 
seriously undermine substantial governmental interests.‖  Id. at 53. 
69. Riley v. Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).  Unlike the regulations in  
Schaumburg and Munson, the North Carolina statute was explicitly limited to professional solicitors.  
Id. at 784 n.2. 
70. Id. at 787–89. 
71. Id. at 789. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 795. 
75. Id. at 798. 
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The Court concluded that the disclosure provision was unconstitutional 
because the means chosen to accomplish the State‘s interest in informing 
donors were ―unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.‖76  Justice 
Brennan‘s choice of wording here is curiously vague.  When Riley was 
decided in 1988, it was settled doctrine that courts applied strict scrutiny to a 
content-based regulation of protected speech.
77
  But rather than follow this 
standard, Justice Brennan hedged with the phrase ―exacting scrutiny‖ and 
avoided the familiar terms of ―compelling interest‖ and ―least restrictive 
means.‖78  The Court was either deliberately carving out a unique standard of 
review for content-based regulation of charitable solicitation or unnecessarily 
perpetuating ambiguity and imprecision.  Riley made clear, however, that 
whatever exacting scrutiny meant, it was the test that the Court had used in 
Munson, and by implication, in Schaumburg.
79
 
Riley added an additional wrinkle in its analysis of the disclosure 
provision.  Having concluded that ―[m]andating speech that a speaker would 
not otherwise make‖ rendered a regulation content-based,80 Riley appeared to 
have announced that any disclosure provision would be subjected to exacting 
scrutiny.  But Justice Brennan then cited two examples of compelled 
disclosures that would be constitutionally permissible—requiring financial 
disclosure reports
81
 and requiring that a professional solicitor disclose his or 
 
76. Id.  The Court opined that ―[i]n contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly 
burdensome rule the State has adopted to reduce its alleged donor misperception, more benign and 
narrowly tailored options are available.‖  Id. at 800. 
77. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 413, 449–50 (1993) (―The period of the early 1980‘s [sic] marked the beginning of the 
relatively consistent practices, by the Supreme Court, of clearly distinguishing between 
content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.‖). 
78. Although the majority in Riley never used the term strict scrutiny, Justice Rehnquist‘s 
dissent classified the majority‘s test as such.  Riley, 487 U.S. at 810–11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)  
(―The Court concludes, after a lengthy discussion of the constitutionality of ‗compelled statements,‘ 
that strict scrutiny should be applied and that the statute does not survive that scrutiny.‖).  
79. Compare id. at 789 (The Court used ―exacting scrutiny‖ in Munson.) with id. at 798 (North 
Carolina‘s content-based regulation is subject to ―exacting First Amendment scrutiny.‖). 
80. Id. at 795. 
81. Id. at 788.  Riley noted that Schaumburg had observed that the government would have 
been free to require charities to file financial disclosure reports.  Id.  Leslie Espinoza asserts that 
Schaumburg took 
 
an absolutist first amendment approach to fund-raising disclosure statutes, 
leaving no room for the Court to balance the potentially different regulatory 
interests in charitable solicitation as opposed to charitable advocacy.  Backed 
into a corner, the Court issued an internally contradictory opinion on disclosure 
and left little opportunity for states to develop appropriate regulation. 
Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable 
Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 612 (1991). 
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her professional status.
82
  The latter exception drew disagreement from Justice 
Scalia, who observed that it  
 
represent[ed] a departure from our traditional understanding, 
embodied in the First Amendment, that where the 
dissemination of ideas is concerned, it is safer to assume that 
the people are smart enough to get the information they need 
than to assume that the government is wise or impartial 
enough to make the judgment for them.
83
 
D. Revisiting Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley 
Not surprisingly, the federal appellate courts have split in their 
interpretations of Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley.  The Eighth
84
 and Tenth
85
 
Circuits have concluded that Schaumburg established a test of intermediate 
scrutiny for a content-neutral regulation.  Conversely, the Third
86
 and 
Eleventh
87
 Circuits have cited Schaumburg for the modern strict scrutiny test.  
The Fourth Circuit has recently announced that ―[i]t is unclear‖ whether the 
Court‘s standard amounts to strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.88  The 
confusion is equally apparent in the trial courts.
89
 
 
82. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11. 
83. Id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
84. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2005) (―Although 
the Supreme Court has not specified whether the Schaumburg test is an intermediate scrutiny review 
of a content-neutral regulation, we have interpreted it as such.‖) (citing Pryor, 258 F.3d at 851); Nat‘l 
Fed. of the Blind of Ark., Inc. v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2001) (comparing 
Schaumburg to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).  But see Video Software 
Dealers Ass‘n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that Sable Commc‘n of Cal., 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), quoted Schaumburg as part of its strict scrutiny formulation). 
85. See Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Schaumburg for intermediate scrutiny test of content-neutral regulation). 
86. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schaumburg for the 
proposition that ―[a]s in all areas of constitutional strict scrutiny jurisprudence, the government must 
establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest, and that it 
seeks to protect its interest in a manner that is the least restrictive of protected speech‖) vacated by 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 
344 (3d Cir. 1992) (characterizing Schaumburg as having struck down ―a content-based restriction 
on door-to-door solicitation because restriction was not sufficiently narrowly tailored‖). 
87. See Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1542 
n.34 (11th Cir. 1993) (―We believe the same can be said with respect to Village of Schaumburg and 
the other strict scrutiny cases relied upon by the city.‖ (citation omitted)). 
88. Nat‘l Fed. of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005).  Curiously, the court 
concluded that ―[r]egardless of the label, the substance of the test is clear.‖  Id.  Cf. Famine Relief 
Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747, 754 (4th Cir. 1990); Telco Commc‘n, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 
F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989).  The Ninth Circuit has cited Schaumburg in addressing charitable 
solicitation regulation but has not explicitly characterized the case under content analysis or tiered 
scrutiny.  See Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 1993) (Schaumburg and other 
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I turn now to the possible reasons for the Court‘s confusing guidance in its 
charitable solicitation cases.  Schaumburg‘s difficulties begin with its failure 
to address content analysis and tiered scrutiny, even though both concepts 
were squarely before the Court.  The Village of Schaumburg asserted in its 
reply brief that its ordinance should not face strict scrutiny because it was 
―[neutral] on its face and neutral in its administration.‖90  The Village cited 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy for the proposition that ―[r]estrictions on the 
time, place or manner of expression are permissible provided that ‗they are 
imposed without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they 
serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.‘‖91  
Conversely, the nonprofit group Citizens for a Better Environment contended 
that ―[o]nly a narrowly-drawn ordinance that serves a compelling state interest 
with narrow specificity and is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment 
can survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed restriction 
on freedom of speech.‖92  In essence, then, the parties asked the Court to 
decide whether the relevant standard of review was strict or intermediate 
scrutiny.  But rather than employing the standards briefed by the parties, the 
Court ignored content analysis altogether and sidestepped the debate over 
whether strict scrutiny was warranted. 
The Court‘s lack of clarity may be partially attributable to the views about 
tiered scrutiny held by the Justices central to the development of its approach 
to charitable solicitation.  Four Justices were in the majorities of all three 
major cases: Justice White (the author of Schaumburg), Justice Blackmun 
(who authored Munson), Justice Brennan (who authored Riley), and Justice 
 
cases hold that solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech, and ―restrictions on 
solicitation in traditional public forums must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government 
interest.‖). 
89. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1296 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (citing Schaumburg as intermediate scrutiny test); Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 
F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029, 1030 (D.N.D. 2003) (relying on Schaumburg and asserting both that ―[t]he 
statute does not have to be the least restrictive means of regulation‖ and that the restriction ―must 
withstand strict scrutiny‖); Tenn. Law Enforcement Youth Found., Inc. v. Millsaps, No. 89-2762-G, 
1991 WL 523878, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 3, 1991) (citing Schaumburg as strict scrutiny test). 
90. Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 6, Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 
620 (1980) (No. 78-1335). 
91. Id. at 12 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976)). 
92. Respondents‘ Brief at 14, Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (No. 78-1335) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The Village countered that ―[t]he cases cited by the respondents in their brief simply d o 
not lend any credence to the concept that an ordinance regulating the solicitation of funds is subject 
to strict scrutiny.‖  Petitioner‘s Reply Brief, supra note 90, at 10. 
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Marshall.
93
  Two years before Schaumburg, these same four Justices had 
expressed their reservations about tiered scrutiny in the landmark affirmative 
action case Regents of University of California v. Bakke.
94
  In their joint 
partial concurrence, the Justices found it ―necessary to define with precision 
the meaning of that inexact term, ‗strict scrutiny.‘‖95  They contended that ―a 
government practice or statute which restricts ‗fundamental rights‘ or which 
contains ‗suspect classifications‘ is to be subjected to ‗strict scrutiny‘ and can 
be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even 
then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.‖96  But wary of 
endorsing tiered scrutiny, the Justices made clear that ―[w]e do not pause to 
debate whether our cases establish a ‗two-tier‘ analysis, a ‗sliding scale‘ 
analysis, or something else altogether‖ because ―[i]t is enough for present 
purposes that strict scrutiny is applied at least in some cases.‖97 
The following year, Justice Blackmun distanced himself from his 
qualified recognition of strict scrutiny in Bakke.  Concurring in Illinois State 
Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
98
 Justice Blackmun lamented 
the Court‘s ongoing efforts to clarify strict scrutiny: 
 
I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a 
―compelling state interest‖ is. . . . And, for me, ―least drastic 
means‖ is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the 
Court has chosen to reach.  A judge would be unimaginative 
indeed if he could not come up with something a little less 
 
93. Schaumburg was an 8-1 decision in 1980, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting.  Justice 
O‘Connor replaced Justice Stewart in 1981.  Munson was decided in 1984 by a 5-4 margin, with 
Justice Stevens concurring and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and O‘Connor joining  
Justice Rehnquist in dissent.  Justice Burger‘s departure in 1986 resulted in Justice Rehnquist‘s 
elevation to Chief Justice and Justice Scalia‘s introduction to the Court.  The following year, Justice 
Kennedy replaced Justice Powell.  In 1988, Riley was a more fractured decision with Justices White, 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy fully joining Justice Brennan‘s majority opinion.  Although 
Justice Stevens joined the majority in Schaumburg and Munson and most of the Court‘s opinion in 
Riley, his concurrence in Munson distinguishes him from the other four Justices in all three 
majorities. 
94. 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 357 n.30.  Two months prior to Bakke, Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall and 
Brennan, had derided any attempt by the Court to recalculate a legislative balancing of interests.  See 
First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (―What is  
inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as to the proper balance for that of 
Massachusetts where the State has passed legislation reasonably designed to further First 
Amendment interests in the context of the political arena where the expertise of legislators is at its 
peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.‖). 
98. 440 U.S. 173 (1979). 
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―drastic‖ or a little less ―restrictive‖ in almost any situation, 
and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.  
This is reminiscent of the Court‘s indulgence, a few decades 
ago, in substantive due process in the economic area as a 
means of nullification. 
 
I feel, therefore, and have always felt, that these phrases 
are really not very helpful for constitutional analysis.  They 
are too convenient and result oriented, and I must endeavor to 
disassociate myself from them.
99
 
 
Justice Blackmun, at least, had serious reservations about the application of 
strict scrutiny to constitutional matters. 
Notwithstanding the apparent hesitancy of some members of the Court to 
endorse tiered scrutiny, much of the confusion in Schaumburg was likely 
genuine rather than obscurantist.  The Court had not yet settled on a consistent 
application of either content analysis or tiered scrutiny in First Amendment 
cases when it decided Schaumburg, and the analytical difficulties posed by 
these emerging concepts were compounded by the Court‘s newfound 
acceptance of commercial speech.  Virginia Board of Pharmacy announced 
that commercial speech would receive some kind of protection, ostensibly 
something more than the rational basis scrutiny that the Court had previously 
applied to commercial speech regulation.
100
  But Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass‟n made clear that commercial speech would not receive the same 
protection as other protected speech.
101
  Schaumburg introduced another 
complexity by insisting that charitable solicitation was not simply commercial 
speech because it ―[did] more than inform private economic decisions and 
[was] not primarily concerned with providing information about the 
characteristics and costs of goods and services.‖102  But nor was there any 
indication that charitable solicitation was core political speech.  Taken 
together, Schaumburg and the commercial speech cases meant that 
commercial speech received something more than rational basis scrutiny and 
charitable solicitation received something more than the protection afforded 
commercial speech but less than that given to core political speech.
103
  This 
hierarchy proved difficult to keep straight. 
 
99. Id. at 188–89 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
100. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976). 
101. 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978). 
102. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
103. The confusion caused by these concepts was evident in footnote 7 of the Court‘s opinion 
in Schaumburg, which noted that  
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The emerging commercial speech doctrine also complicated content 
analysis.  By the time the Court decided Schaumburg, it was clear that a 
content-based restriction of protected speech received strict scrutiny and a 
content-neutral restriction received something less than strict scrutiny.  But 
the Court‘s uncertainty of how to address commercial speech and charitable 
solicitation left unclear what level of scrutiny would be applied to content-
neutral regulations of those forms of speech.  When Schaumburg signaled that 
charitable solicitation was ―fully protected speech,‖ it did so to distinguish 
charitable solicitation from commercial solicitation.
104
  It did not mean that 
regulation of charitable solicitation would always be subject to strict scrutiny 
because content analysis required varied levels of scrutiny for all forms of 
protected speech, even core political speech.
105
  Schaumburg‘s avoidance of 
content analysis left unclear whether charitable solicitation always merited the 
same degree of protection as other core speech, or whether, like commercial 
speech, it sometimes fell into an ambiguous middle category.
106
 
 
[t]o the extent that any of the Court‘s past decisions . . . hold or indicate that 
commercial speech is excluded from First Amendment protections, those 
decisions, to that extent, are no longer good law.  For the purposes of applying 
the overbreadth doctrine, however, it remains relevant to distinguish between 
commercial and noncommercial speech.   
Id. at 632 n.7 (citations omitted).  The Court did not explain why distinguishing between commercial 
and noncommercial speech remained relevant in the context of the overbreadth doctrine.   Three 
years earlier, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court had cryptically asserted that ―the justification 
for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial 
context.‖  433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).  The only support the Court offered for this assertion was that 
―[s]ince advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is 
particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.‖  Id. at 381. 
104. The distinction was by no means nontrivial.  Tribe has highlighted the importance of 
―maintaining some residual distinctions between commercial and ideological expression on the 
ground that the former is valued only for the ‗facts‘ it conveys while the latter ‗is integrally related to 
the exposition of thought—thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man.‘‖  
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 655 (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)).  Writing two years prior to Schaumburg, Tribe 
cautioned that distinguishing between commercial speech and other kinds of speech ―may be needed 
if constitutional doctrine is to recognize the ‗commonsense differences between speech that does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.‘‖  Id. (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 
425 U.S. at 771 n.24).  Ten years later, in the second edition of his treatise, Tribe lamented that ―the 
Court has repeatedly struggled with defining the differences between commercial and non-
commercial speech, notwithstanding its offhand announcement that the difference between the two is 
based on ‗commonsense.‘‖  LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894 (2d ed. 
1988). 
105. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980) (―The ‗absolutely protected‘ 
character of the message cannot insulate [all] forms of expression from regulation: context—the 
threat the particular expressive event poses—obviously is relevant and sometimes will be 
dispositive.‖). 
106. Cf. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1159 (15th ed. 
2004) (―[C]ommercial speech continues to stand as the lone formal exception to the two-level 
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Unable or unwilling to synthesize the concepts before it, the Court failed 
to articulate a workable framework in Schaumburg.  Four years later, the 
Court‘s significant reliance on Schaumburg in Munson prevented it from 
drawing upon more cogent developments elsewhere in its First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  This tunnel vision is particularly evident when Munson is 
compared to another First Amendment case decided just forty-two days 
earlier, Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.
107
  Vincent 
involved a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on 
public property.
108
  Supporters of a local political candidate contracted with a 
political sign service company to create and post campaign signs.
109
  After the 
signs were duly removed by the City, the supporters and the sign company 
sought an injunction.
110
  The Court determined that the ordinance was neutral 
as to viewpoint and then cited O‟Brien for ―the appropriate framework for 
reviewing a viewpoint-neutral regulation.‖111  The Court concluded that the 
Los Angeles ordinance withstood O‟Brien‘s test and left open adequate 
alternative means of communication.
112
  Justice Brennan, joined by Justices 
Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, explaining that: 
 
The Court‘s first task is to determine whether the ordinance is 
aimed at suppressing the content of speech, and, if it is, 
whether a compelling state interest justifies the suppression 
[citing Consolidated Edison and Mosley].  If the restriction is 
content-neutral, the court‘s task is to determine (1) whether 
the governmental objective advanced by the restriction is 
substantial, and (2) whether the restriction imposed on speech 
is no greater than is essential to further that objective.  Unless 
both conditions are met the restriction must be invalidated.
113
 
 
Disagreeing with the Court‘s intimation that the Los Angeles ordinance left 
open ample means of communication like handbill distribution,
114
 Justice 
Brennan wrote that: 
 
 
approach to speech set forth in Chaplinsky . . . .  [I]t enjoys First Amendment protection, but not as 
much First Amendment protection as other speech.‖). 
107. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
108. Id. at 791. 
109. Id. at 792. 
110. Id. at 793. 
111. Id. at 804. 
112. Id. at 812. 
113. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. at 812. 
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The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by 
passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is typically 
read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not only must 
handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be 
spent distributing them.  The average cost of communicating 
by handbill is therefore likely to be far higher than the 
average cost of communicating by poster. For that reason, 
signs posted on public property are doubtless ―essential to the 
poorly financed causes of little people,‖115 and their 
prohibition constitutes a total ban on an important medium of 
communication.  Because the City has completely banned the 
use of this particular medium of communication, and because, 
given the circumstances, there are no equivalent alternative 
media that provide an adequate substitute, the Court must 
examine with particular care the justifications that the City 
proffers for its ban.
116
 
 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun thus highlighted three important 
factors in analyzing a speech restriction: (1) the need to begin with content 
analysis; (2) the appropriate test for reviewing a content-neutral regulation; 
and (3) the importance of considering the potentially disparate effects of a 
regulation on ―the poorly financed causes of little people.‖117  One month 
later, these same three Justices joined the narrow majority in Munson in an 
opinion authored by Justice Blackmun.  Yet none of the doctrinal or equitable 
considerations from the Vincent dissent surfaced in Munson.
118
  Four years 
later, Riley alluded to disparate effects and acknowledged the need for 
content-analysis but did little else to clarify the ambiguities in Schaumburg 
and Munson. 
E. Subsequent Cases 
Less than a year after Riley, the Court issued its decision in Sable 
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, striking down under strict 
scrutiny review a ban on ―dial-a-porn‖ telephone messages that were indecent 
but not obscene.
119
  Sable is interesting in the present context not for its 
substantive analysis but for its formulation of strict scrutiny.  Justice White 
observed that: 
 
115. Justice Brennan quoted Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (invalidating 
a city ordinance that restricted door-to-door distributions of circulars). 
116. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820 (citations omitted). 
117. Id. at 820–21. 
118. See Sec‘y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
119. Sable Commc‘ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989). 
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The Government may . . . regulate the content of 
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a 
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means 
to further the articulated interest. . . . [T]o withstand 
constitutional scrutiny, ―it must do so by narrowly drawn 
regulations designed to serve those interests without 
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment 
freedoms.‖ [citing Schaumburg].  It is not enough to show 
that the Government‘s ends are compelling; the means 
must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.
120
 
 
Because Justice White had authored Schaumburg, his citation to that case as 
part of his strict scrutiny analysis in Sable added further support to the view 
that Riley‘s ―exacting scrutiny‖ (derived from Schaumburg) was actually strict 
scrutiny. 
The Court‘s only substantive post-Riley discussion of Schaumburg‘s 
charitable solicitation principles came one year after Sable in United States v. 
Kokinda.
121
  Kokinda involved a challenge to a Postal Service regulation that 
permitted charitable advocacy but not charitable solicitation.
122
  A plurality of 
the Court began its analysis by citing Schaumburg and Riley for the 
proposition that ―[s]olicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the 
First Amendment.‖123  The plurality continued that ―[u]nder our First 
Amendment jurisprudence, we must determine the level of scrutiny that 
applies to the regulation of protected speech at issue.‖124  Applying forum 
 
120. Id. at 126. 
121. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).  Other than Sable and Kokinda, the Court has cited Schaumburg only 
seven times since Riley: Davenport v. Washington Education Ass‟n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (2007) 
(citing Schaumburg for overbreadth doctrine); McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 
93, 140 (2003); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (overbreadth doctrine); Illinois ex rel. 
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611 (2003); Watchtower Bible & Tract 
Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 163 (2002) (citing Schaumburg for 
principle that ―our cases involving nonreligious speech‖ show that ―the Jehovah‘s Witnesses are not 
the only ‗little people‘ who face the risk of silencing by regulations like the Village‘s‖); International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1992); and Massachusetts v. 
Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) (overbreadth doctrine).  Of these, only Madigan discusses 
Schaumburg in detail (and it leaves unaltered the Court‘s approach to charitable solicitation).  538 
U.S. at 612–17.  Madigan involved a fraud prosecution of a professional charitable fundraiser.  Id. at 
617.  The Court made clear that its ―opinions in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley took care to leave a 
corridor open for fraud actions to guard the public against false or misleading charitable 
solicitations.‖  Id. 
122. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 722–23. 
123. Id. at 725. 
124. Id. 
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analysis
125
 (which had not been at issue in Schaumburg, Munson, or Riley) 
and content analysis, the plurality concluded that the content-neutral Postal 
Service regulation governed a nonpublic forum and upheld the 
constitutionality of the regulation under rational basis scrutiny.
126
 
Although the Justices disagreed on the application of forum analysis,
127
 
Kokinda is most interesting for its parsing of solicitation and advocacy.  
Joined by Justice Kennedy, the plurality approved of the regulation‘s content-
neutral distinction ―because solicitation is inherently disruptive of the Postal 
Service‘s business.‖128  In Schaumburg, the Court appeared to have foreclosed 
such an easy separation of solicitation and advocacy, having pronounced that 
―solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps 
persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views 
on economic, political, or social issues.‖129  Kokinda‘s distinction between 
solicitation and advocacy is also tenuous because it appears to discriminate 
based on content.  Mosley had indicated that regulations making subject 
matter distinctions were content-based, a view that the Court reinforced five 
months after Schaumburg in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public 
Service Commission of New York.
130
  In light of these cases, the Kokinda 
plurality‘s reasoning is questionable.  It is unlikely, for example, that a 
regulation excluding religious advocacy would have been subjected to rational 
 
125. See Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Lehman 
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–03 (1974). 
126. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732–33. 
127. See, e.g., id. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 732 (plurality opinion).  The issue of content analysis provoked an extended 
exchange between the plurality and the dissent.  See id. at 733–36; id. at 753–54, 760 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
129. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
130. 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (―[A] constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner 
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.‖).  Concurring in the 
judgment, Justice Stevens questioned this assertion, arguing that 
 
every lawyer who has read . . . our cases upholding various restrictions on 
speech with specific reference to subject matter must recognize the hyperbole in 
[Mosley‘s] dictum: ‗But, above all else, the First Amendment means that the 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.‘ 
Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  Stone‘s 1978 article intimated that subject 
matter restrictions were in some ―intermediate position‖ between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions and might be ―properly subject to a more variable sort of analysis.‖  Stone, supra note 6, 
at 100; see id. at 83.  More recently, the Court has been less than clear about subject matter 
distinctions.  Compare Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (―Regulation of the subject matter 
of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of 
content-based regulation‖) with id. at 724 (A regulation that distinguishes between speech activities 
likely to have the consequences against which it seeks to protect and speech activities unlikely to 
have those consequences ―cannot be struck down for failure to maintain ‗content neutrality.‘‖).  
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basis scrutiny simply because the Postal Service believed that religious 
advocacy was more disruptive than other forms of advocacy. 
IV. A NEW TEST FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION 
I have argued above that the Court‘s failure to incorporate the concepts of 
content analysis and tiered scrutiny in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley and 
the ambiguous relationship between charitable solicitation and commercial 
speech have produced an ill-defined test for reviewing charitable solicitation 
regulation.  The Court exacerbated these problems with its decisions in Sable 
and Kokinda, which modified its approach to charitable solicitation with the 
seemingly contradictory suggestions that: (1) Schaumburg had applied strict 
scrutiny to a regulation governing charitable solicitation; and (2) charitable 
solicitation was less protected than Schaumburg had implied.
131
 
The best way to bring a more coherent approach to judicial review of 
charitable solicitation regulation is to reconcile Schaumburg with current 
understandings of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech.  
In doing so, we should also take care to recognize the value of charitable 
solicitation in a democratic polity, the kind of normative concern that can too 
easily be lost in rigid application of doctrinal formulas.  With these doctrinal 
and normative concerns in mind, I argue for a more flexible approach to 
charitable solicitation regulation rooted in a balancing of interests.  I turn now 
to the project of constructing that approach. 
A. The First Amendment Value of Charitable Solicitation 
I base my approach to charitable solicitation regulation on a ―civic 
conception of free speech‖ that pays particular attention to forms of speech 
that advance self-governance and democratic discourse.
132
  From this 
framework, I suggest that regulation of charitable solicitation should be 
carefully scrutinized for three reasons: (1) the link between charitable 
solicitation and advocacy; (2) the inequalities among different kinds of 
charitable organizations; and (3) the disparate effects of content-neutral 
regulation on smaller and less popular charitable organizations. 
 
131. One way to reconcile these two developments is to characterize Schaumburg as a strict 
scrutiny test of a content-based regulation, which would mean that a content-neutral regulation like 
that at issue in Kokinda would be subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny.  Schaumburg‘s lack of any 
content analysis makes this characterization difficult to sustain. 
132. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 28.  Sunstein links this civic conception to Justice Louis 
Brandeis‘s famous concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring).  Sunstein describes Justice Brandeis‘s theory as rooted in ―classical republican thought, 
with its emphasis on political virtue, on public-spiritedness, on public deliberation, and on the 
relationship between character and citizenship.‖  SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 27. 
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1. Solicitation and Advocacy 
One of the challenges of a civic conception of the First Amendment is 
brought to light when the government regulates speech in order to protect the 
privacy interests of an unwilling listener.
133
  Two seemingly incommensurable 
interests—speech and privacy—are pitted against each other, and we must 
consider what factors should be considered in striking an appropriate balance 
between these interests.  Settled doctrine points to the location in which the 
speech occurs as one factor to consider.
134
  A more civic-minded approach 
might also consider the content of the speech—the degree to which the speech 
contributes to the democratic project.  But a civic approach goes beyond even 
this instrumental value.  As Robert Post has suggested: 
 
To include speech within public discourse is to signify that it 
is constitutionally valued not merely for the contribution it 
may make to public discussion, but also, intrinsically, for the 
engagement it represents in the public life of a nation.  A 
democracy cannot flourish unless its citizens actively 
participate in the formation of its public opinion.  Such 
participation is ―precious‖ and to be encouraged for its own 
sake.
135
 
 
The civic importance of charitable solicitation stems partly from the link 
between solicitation and advocacy.  Even the act of solicitation can itself be a 
form of advocacy.  In Schaumburg, the Court stated that ―solicitation is 
characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech 
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, 
political, or social issues, and . . . without solicitation the flow of such 
information and advocacy would likely cease.‖136  Solicitation is also linked to 
 
133. The privacy interests of an individual were famously advanced by Justice Brandeis and his 
law partner, Sam Warren.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (defining privacy as the right ―to be let alone‖). 
134. For example, the Court has observed that the government‘s interest ―in protecting the 
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and 
civilized society,‖ and that ―[o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the 
unwilling listener.‖  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988). 
135. Post, supra note 41, at 20.  Post contends that the Court‘s charitable solicitation cases hold 
―that charitable solicitations are part of public discourse rather than commercial speech.‖  Id. at 20 
n.86. 
136. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see 
also Riley v. Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (criticizing the state‘s 
assumption that ―the charity derive[d] no benefit from funds collected but not turned over to it‖ 
because ―where the solicitation is combined with the advocacy and dissemination of information, the 
charity reaps a substantial benefit from the act of solicitation itself‖).  The Court provided an 
example of an organization whose advocacy interests are directly advanced by solicitation in Illinois 
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advocacy because solicitation may fund speech undertaken on a separate 
occasion.  Justice Scalia alluded to this in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission: ―an attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech 
itself.‖137 
These observations hold not only for charitable solicitation but also for 
other forms of solicitation, including commercial solicitation and 
panhandling.  Is there a principled distinction between these latter forms of 
solicitation—neither of which receives elevated First Amendment 
protection—and nonfraudulent charitable solicitation?138  In Young v. New 
York City Transit Authority, the Second Circuit suggested that panhandling 
failed to implicate core First Amendment values: 
 
The only message that we are able to [discern] as common to 
all acts of begging is that beggars want to exact money from 
those whom they accost.  While we acknowledge that 
[subway] passengers generally understand this generic 
message, we think it falls far outside the scope of protected 
speech under the First Amendment.  We certainly do not 
consider it as a ―means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth.‖139 
 
The Supreme Court expressed a similar view about commercial speech in 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‟n, observing that commercial speech was 
afforded ―a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate 
position in the scale of First Amendment values.‖140 
These distinctions are not impervious to challenge.  Young was written 
over a vigorous dissent from Judge Meskill, who noted that the panhandler 
 
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 622 n.11 (2003) (―Telephone 
solicitors retained by [Mothers Against Drunk Driving] ‗reach millions of people a year, and each 
call educates the public about the tragedy of drunk driving, provides statistics and asks the customer 
to always designate a sober driver.‘‖). 
137. 540 U.S. 93, 253 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
Scalia cited Schaumburg and several other cases to support his contention.  See also TRIBE, supra 
note 104, at 829–30  (―Solicitation of contributions, wherever it takes place‖ is an activity that has 
―historically been recognized as inextricably intertwined with speech or petition‖ and its regulation 
―must therefore be assessed with particular sensitivity to the possible constriction of that breathing 
space which freedom of speech requires in the society contemplated by the first amendment.‖) ; 
Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 45 (―Central to any meaningful right of speech are the resources necessary 
to exercise the right.‖). 
138. The state can always regulate fraudulent charitable solicitation.  See Madigan, 538 U.S. at 
612 (―Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is unprotected 
speech.‖). 
139. 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990). 
140. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
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plaintiffs had stated in affidavits that ―they often speak with potential donors 
about subjects such as the problems of the homeless and poor, the perceived 
inefficiency of the social service system in New York and the dangerous 
nature of the public shelters in which they sometimes sleep.‖141  Jed 
Rubenfeld has similarly posited that begging is political speech ―from a 
certain, perfectly plausible point of view sounding in political theory, 
sociology, and so on.‖142  But Sunstein offers a different perspective: 
 
[I]t is plausible to think that almost all speech is political in 
the sense that it relates in some way to the existing social and 
political structure.  Commercial speech and obscenity are 
examples.  But if some people understand the speech in 
question to be political, it cannot follow that the speech 
qualifies as such for constitutional purposes, without treating 
almost all speech as political.
143
 
 
Elsewhere, Sunstein observes that the absence of constitutional protection for 
some forms of speech ―owes at least something to the common-sense 
judgment that different values are placed on different categories of speech.‖144 
Although my contention that there is a principled distinction between 
charitable and other forms of solicitation is contestable, it is no less plausible 
than any line-drawing short of absolutism.
145
  Moreover, my distinction tracks 
similar demarcations made elsewhere, notably, in the federal tax code, which 
 
141. Young, 903 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
142. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment‟s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 801 (2001); see 
also Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to 
Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 899 (1991) (―The beggar may describe in her plea why she has been 
forced to beg, and the begging may lead to a discussion of larger issues.  But even if the beggar 
conveys nothing more than that she wants the listener to give her money, this information contributes 
to the collective search for truth.‖). 
143. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 132. 
144. Id. at 125. 
145. Justice Brandeis, for example, argued that the government could abrogate the right of free 
speech ―in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or 
moral.‖  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Justice Brandeis 
provides a partial answer as to when the protection of the state might justify a restraint on speech: 
The evil should be ―so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.  If 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.  Only an 
emergency can justify repression.‖  Id. at 377.  This, of course, only bounds the indeterminacy; it 
does not eliminate it.  (What is an emergency?  Who decides imminence?  What constitutes a 
falsehood, and by whose standards?)  Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 149 (―There is no way to 
operate a system of free expression without drawing lines.‖). 
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extends favorable benefits to many charitable organizations but not to 
commercial entities or beggars.
146
 
2. The Distinctions Within Charitable Solicitation 
As a practical matter, charities compete for limited financial resources 
with unequal ability.  As the umbrella organization Independent Sector argued 
in its amicus brief in Riley: ―[s]olicitations and communications about the 
substance of a charity‘s work, especially when oral, are inherently fragile—
each contact involves competition for the citizen‘s limited time, attention and 
money.‖147  Leslie Espinoza makes a similar contention, noting that ―at least 
theoretically, there is to some extent a limited ‗pool‘ of potential charitable 
contributions.‖148  According to Espinoza, this constraint became visible in the 
years following World War II, when ―[e]xponential growth in communication 
and the mechanization of solicitation, both through direct mail appeals and 
telephone appeals, opened new opportunities to reach donors and increased 
competition for contributions.‖149  Because increased competition ―lowered 
the revenues of established charities,‖150 these charities ―consciously 
promoted‖ fund-raising limits ―to restrict diversity and competitiveness within 
the charitable community.‖151  Under Espinoza‘s thesis, the states, persuaded 
by larger established charities to enact greater regulation, actually diminished 
the diversity of viewpoints in the charitable sector. 
Espinoza‘s perspective is consistent with the Court‘s observation that 
regulation of professional charitable solicitation disproportionately affects 
small or unpopular charities.
152
  These charities include law enforcement 
foundations, veterans groups, and social advocacy groups whose purposes are 
unmistakably among those of core political speech: endorsing legislation, 
 
146. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1)–(28) (2006) (containing extensive definitions as to which 
entities qualify as ―exempt organizations‖). 
147. Brief for Independent Sector et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Appellees, Riley v. Nat‘l 
Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328). (―Amici include advocacy 
organizations (of all political stripes), who also must overcome many citizens‘ discomfort with 
troubling issues and viewpoints.  Accordingly, any compelled disclosure, especially when on a topic 
not chosen by the organization, tends to chill free speech by diverting the citizen‘s attention and 
undercutting the good will that links solicitor and citizen.‖). 
148. Espinoza, supra note 81, at 654. 
149. Id. at 635. 
150. Id. at 654. 
151. Id. at 610.  Espinoza highlights the protectionist bias of established charities that was 
evident in a report issued by an ad hoc committee of academics and representatives from 
corporations and nonprofit organizations.  Id. at 650.  This report advocated that service-oriented 
charities would be better off with ―a smaller number and a greater joint effort.‖  Id. at 651 (quoting 
VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
BY AN AD HOC CITIZENS COMMITTEE 30 (R. Hamlin ed., 1961)). 
152. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799. 
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promoting messages and programs in the interest of public welfare and safety, 
and furthering the causes of marginalized groups.  Regulations that vanquish 
these voices from the public square, whether directly or indirectly, endanger 
―those processes of communication that must remain open to the participation 
of citizens if democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.‖153 
3. The Disparate Effects of Content-Neutral Regulation 
Regulation of charitable solicitation will seldom if ever be content-based 
under the current test for content analysis articulated in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism.
154
  The government will rarely attempt to regulate charitable 
solicitation out of disagreement with the message it conveys, but will typically 
do so in order to advance government interests unrelated to the content of 
expression such as public safety, fraud prevention, or residential privacy.
155
  
Accordingly, these regulations will be subject to less than strict scrutiny.
156
  
But putative distinctions between content-neutral and content-based 
regulations threaten diversity in the charitable sector because, as Kenneth 
Karst has observed, ―regulations that are formally neutral as to speech 
content‖ may result in ―de facto content discrimination.‖157  Justice Marshall, 
joined by Justice Brennan, expressed a similar concern in his dissent in Clark 
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, decided three days before Munson. 
 
[T]he Court has dramatically lowered its scrutiny of 
governmental regulations once it has determined that [time, 
place, and manner] regulations are content-neutral.  The result 
 
153. Post, supra note 41, at 7. 
154. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
155. Government regulation of professional charitable solicitation may take the form of 
subject-matter or speaker-based restrictions, but will seldom be viewpoint-discriminatory. 
156. Of course, a regulation deemed to be content-based under Ward would be subject to strict 
scrutiny and would likely be unsustainable. 
157. Karst, supra note 13, at 35, 37.  Karst viewed this kind of discrimination as 
―presumptively invalid‖ under the First Amendment‘s ―equality principle.‖  Id. at 37.  For Karst, 
―[t]he principle of equality, when understood to mean equal liberty, is not just a peripheral support 
for the freedom of expression, but rather part of the ‗central meaning of the First Amendment.‘‖   Id. 
at 21 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)).  A showing ―that a formally 
neutral law has discriminatory effect deserves great weight in persuading a court to look closely at 
the necessity for the regulation.‖  Id. at 39.  For more on the concept of de facto differential effects of 
content-neutral regulations, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 171 (Some content-neutral restrictions 
―may foreclose important expressive outlets and have profound content-differential effects.‖); TRIBE, 
supra note 9, at 682–83 (―Even a wholly neutral government regulation or policy, aimed entirely at 
harms unconnected with the content of any communication, may be invalid if it leaves too little 
breathing space for communicative activity, or leaves people with too little access to channels of 
communication, whether as would-be speakers or would-be listeners.‖ (emphasis in original)); Stone, 
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 221 (There can be ―de facto 
content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions.‖). 
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has been the creation of a two-tiered approach to First 
Amendment cases: while regulations that turn on the content 
of the expression are subjected to a strict form of judicial 
review, regulations that are aimed at matters other than 
expression receive only a minimal level of scrutiny.  The 
minimal scrutiny prong of this two-tiered approach has led to 
an unfortunate diminution of First Amendment protection.  
By narrowly limiting its concern to whether a given 
regulation creates a content-based distinction, the Court has 
seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral restrictions 
are also capable of unnecessarily restricting protected 
expressive activity.
158
 
 
Justice Marshall elaborated in a footnote: 
 
[A] content-neutral regulation does not necessarily fall with 
random or equal force upon different groups or different 
points of view.  A content-neutral regulation that restricts an 
inexpensive mode of communication will fall most heavily 
upon relatively poor speakers and the points of view that such 
speakers typically espouse.
159
 
 
The problem with contemporary scrutiny of content-neutral regulations is 
that it focuses on the legitimacy of the government‘s action but ignores the 
impact of the regulation on the speaker.  As Stephen Gottlieb has argued, the 
Court‘s adoption of neutrality ―shifted its gaze‖ from the behavior of the 
speaker which meant that ―many problems, such as . . . limitations on access 
to information and access to opportunities for political broadcast and 
inexpensive speech, [became] relatively less visible.‖160  Once the perspective 
shifted from the behavior of the speaker to the behavior of government, 
―governmental interests no longer had to be particularly weighty; they only 
had to be pure.‖161 
 
158. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312–13 (1984) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
159. Id. at 313 n.14; see also Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 57 (―[T]he 
Court long has recognized that by limiting the availability of particular means of communication, 
content-neutral restrictions can significantly impair the ability of individuals to communicate their 
views to others.  This is a central first amendment concern: to the extent that content-neutral 
restrictions actually have this effect, they necessarily dampen the search for truth, impede meaningful 
participation in self-governance, and frustrate individual self-fulfillment.‖); cf. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 192 n.5. 
160. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 34. 
161. Id. at 36. 
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In the area of charitable solicitation, the more burdensome regulations 
usually threaten less established charities.  The reason for this inverse 
relationship is unsurprising: large charities often have either an established 
donor base or sufficient in-house employees or volunteers to conduct 
solicitations; small or unpopular charities, particularly those without a donor 
base or name recognition, often have to undergo the ―necessary evil‖ of 
relying on professional charitable solicitors.
162
  The Supreme Court has also 
recognized this reality, noting that some disfavored methods of solicitation are 
―essential to the poorly financed causes of little people‖163 and that ―small or 
unpopular charities‖ must ―usually rely on professional fundraisers.‖164  The 
disparate effects of regulating charitable solicitation thus endanger the very 
speakers that the First Amendment should most staunchly protect.  A civic 
conception of the First Amendment requires scrutiny of even a content-neutral 
regulation to ensure that any disparate effects are considered in light of the 
democratic project at stake. 
B. The Need for Balancing 
Kathleen Sullivan has observed that ―[t]he suspension of categorical 
reasoning in favor of [intermediate scrutiny] typically comes about from a 
crisis in analogical reasoning‖ when ―[a] set of cases comes along that just 
can‘t be steered readily onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality track.‖165  
Schaumburg and its progeny fall within Sullivan‘s observation.166  As a 
practical matter, strict scrutiny of charitable solicitation regulation is 
implausible under the Court‘s current framework for content analysis because 
a regulation will almost never be aimed at the content of the charitable 
message itself.
167
  More substantively, strict scrutiny could hinder the state 
 
162. See Note, Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations (pt. 4), 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1634, 1635 (1992). 
163. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
164. Riley v. Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 799 (1988). 
165. Kathleen Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 
U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297–98 (1992) (―‗Intermediate scrutiny,‘ unlike the poles of the two-tier 
system, is an overtly balancing mode. . . . Where intermediate scrutiny governs, the outcome is no 
longer foreordained at the threshold.  Instead of winning always or never, the government may 
sometimes win or sometimes lose—it all depends.‖); see also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco 
Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―We sometimes make . . . ‗balancing‘ 
judgments in determining how far the needs of the State can intrude upon the liberties of the 
individual, but that is of the essence of the courts‘ function as the nonpolitical branch.‖ (citation 
omitted)).  But cf. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 583 (Strict scrutiny also involves a kind of balancing.). 
166. Sullivan also points out that balancing has been vituperated by both liberal and 
conservative jurists in different political contexts.  Sullivan, supra note 165, at 316–17. 
167. Even regulations that distinguish between professional charitable solicitors and in-house 
solicitors are at most speaker-based restrictions, which ―are not always considered the practical 
equivalent of content restrictions, so long as the ground on which speakers are classified can be 
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from protecting important interests like fraud prevention and residential 
privacy.  Rational basis scrutiny, on the other hand, fails to account for the 
fundamental speech interests at stake in charitable solicitation.
168
  Balancing, 
as an alternative, ―tends to make the articulation and comparison of competing 
rights and interests more explicit.‖169  A carefully constructed balancing test—
despite the risk inherent in the discretion it leaves to individual judges—may 
be preferable to either of the more rigid alternatives of strict or rational basis 
scrutiny.
170
 
C. Formulating a New Test 
A judicial test for the regulation of charitable solicitation should account 
for the concerns identified above.  It should also reflect the principles of 
content analysis and tiered scrutiny now ensconced in First Amendment law.  
I turn now to constructing such a test, using as a starting point the Eighth 
Circuit‘s decision in National Federation of the Blind of Arkansas, Inc. v. 
Pryor.
171
 
Pryor involved a challenge to an Arkansas statute that required a 
telephone charitable solicitor to end the solicitation when requested to do so 
by the recipient of the call.
172
  After examining Schaumburg and Ward, the 
Eighth Circuit noted that the standards enunciated in those cases were 
―obviously very similar.‖173  Without explicitly announcing its own test, the 
court reviewed: (1) whether the state had a legitimate interest; (2) whether the 
interest was significantly furthered by a regulation narrowly tailored to meet 
that interest; and (3) whether the regulation substantially limited charitable 
solicitation.
174
  These principles may be reformulated as follows: 
 
 
described as related to some aspect of their status independent of their beliefs or points of view.‖  
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 106, at 1199.  Similarly, regulations restricting charitable 
solicitation as a whole are at most subject matter restrictions, a classification that might be subject to 
―a more variable sort of analysis.‖  Stone, supra note 6, at 100. 
168. See Espinoza, supra note 81, at 612. 
169. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 301. 
170. Ely observed that ―balancing tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological 
predispositions of those doing the balancing—or if not that, at least with the relative confidence or 
paranoia of the age in which they are doing it—and we must build barriers as secure as words are 
able to make them.‖  Ely, supra note 18, at 1501.  Ely was writing specifically about regulations that 
proscribe messages because they are dangerous, and although my invocation of his words 
decontextualizes the quote, the abstracted principle retains its importance.  
171. 258 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001). 
172. Id. at 854. 
173. Id. at 855. 
174. Id. at 855–56. 
582 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:551 
A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation will be 
sustained if the regulation furthers a legitimate interest and 
the interest is significantly furthered by a narrowly tailored 
regulation that does not substantially limit charitable 
solicitation.
175
 
 
The critical prong of the Pryor test is whether the regulation ―substantially 
limits‖ charitable solicitation.  This emphasis forces a balancing of interests 
because it examines the degree of the burden that the government‘s regulation 
places on charitable speech.  But while Pryor comes closer to a workable 
standard than Schaumburg, it remains unsatisfactory for three reasons: 
 
1.  Pryor unnecessarily expands an already subjective intermediate 
scrutiny review by supplanting Turner‘s ―important or substantial‖ interest 
with a ―sufficient or legitimate‖ interest that hovers closer to rational basis 
scrutiny than to an elevated standard of review.  Although the important or 
substantial formulation is itself malleable and subject to abuse, terminology 
consistent with precedent provides a modicum of accountability. 
2.  Pryor‘s use of the phrase ―significantly furthers‖ unnecessarily 
introduces an additional subjective factor to the test.  If a regulation is 
narrowly tailored to advance an important or substantial interest, a subjective 
assessment of the degree to which the regulation advances that interest adds 
little substantive value to the test.  The ―significantly furthers‖ inquiry can 
also unwittingly slip a strict scrutiny standard into an intermediate scrutiny 
review.  Suppose an unchallenged law requires a charity to disclose X in order 
to advance the state‘s interest in preventing fraud.  Suppose further that a new 
law requiring the compelled disclosure of X + Y is challenged on First 
Amendment grounds.  Assuming that both regulations are content-neutral, the 
state need not show that X + Y is the least restrictive means of advancing its 
interest in fraud prevention.  But if X + Y must significantly further the state‘s 
interest, the charity could argue that, given the existence of X, the marginal 
benefit of Y does not significantly further that interest.  This leaves the state 
with justification only for disclosure of X.  The charity thus indirectly forces 
the state to comply with a standard more akin to a least restrictive strict 
scrutiny despite the content-neutrality of the regulation.
176
 
 
175. Id. at 854–55.  Although my formulation differs slightly from the test explicated by the 
court at the beginning of Pryor, it is consistent with the language used by the court in its substantive 
analysis. 
176. A similar critique can be made of the commercial speech test developed in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561–66 
(1980).  Under Central Hudson‘s second prong, the government ―must demonstrate that the 
challenged regulation ‗advances the Government‘s interest ―in a direct and material way.‖‘‖  Fla. Bar 
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3.  Pryor‘s ―substantial limitation‖ component tilts too restrictively against 
the government.  By intimating that a regulation cannot substantially limit 
charitable solicitation, Pryor introduces a near-absolute presumption 
reminiscent of strict scrutiny.  Some content-neutral regulations may 
justifiably substantially limit or even foreclose charitable solicitation, just as 
some content-neutral regulations limit other forms of protected speech.  
Precluding the government from any regulation that substantially limits 
solicitation skews the balance against the government‘s ability to regulate. 
 
Pryor‘s test can be modified to address the three concerns described above 
by: (1) replacing ―sufficient or legitimate‖ with ―important or substantial‖; (2) 
removing the ―significantly furthers‖ requirement; and (3) adding a balancing 
component that is effectuated if the regulation substantially limits charitable 
solicitation.  These adjustments produce the following test: 
 
A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation will be 
sustained if it furthers an important or substantial interest 
through a narrowly tailored regulation that does not 
substantially limit charitable solicitation (unless the harm the 
regulation prevents clearly outweighs the harm caused by the 
regulation‘s limitation).177 
 
This test, of course, introduces its own vagaries.  But premised on the need for 
a balancing of interests, it is a more transparent representation of that 
balancing.  It also invites courts to consider the potentially disparate effects of 
content-neutral restrictions. 
The balancing component in the parenthetical of the proposed test is 
conditional: it operates only when a regulation substantially limits charitable 
solicitation.  A narrowly tailored content-neutral regulation that furthers an 
important or substantial government interest should be upheld if its limitation 
on charitable solicitation is insubstantial.  But the substantial limitation 
requirement operates as a check against my elimination of Pryor‘s 
requirement that a regulation significantly further the government interest.  
Consider again a disclosure requirement X.  Removing the ―significantly 
furthers‖ requirement allows the state to regulate X + Y even if Y is only 
marginally effective and therefore protects my test from becoming a de facto 
least restrictive means test.  But left unchecked, the state could rely on this 
 
v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625–26 (1995) (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 
476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993))). 
177. Although I confine this proposed test to the scope of this Article—charitable solicitation—
the test has potentially broader applicability as a modification of the intermediate scrutiny 
formulation in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994). 
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rationale to require disclosure of X + Y + Z and beyond.  At some point, the 
aggregate effect of these disclosures may cause considerable harm to a 
charity.  The substantial limitation language forces the parenthetical balancing 
test when this occurs.  When a court concludes that the limitation is 
substantial, the balancing test favors the charitable speech over the restriction 
by requiring that the harm prevented by the regulation clearly outweigh the 
harm that it causes.  This initial position accords with a speech-protective 
view and signals to legislatures that they must account for the speaker‘s 
interests in crafting their regulations. 
The balancing component also recasts the government‘s stake from the 
importance of the government interest to the harm that the regulation 
prevents.  The focus on harm encompasses both the gravity of the 
government‘s interest and the regulation‘s effectiveness in furthering that 
interest. In this way, the parenthetical in my proposed test recaptures the 
―significantly furthers‖ aspect of Pryor, but this inquiry is only made when 
the regulation substantially limits speech. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although I have argued for a test that more adequately protects the values 
of charitable solicitation, the Court‘s test is ostensibly already speech-
protective: Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley all struck down attempts to 
regulate charitable solicitation.  My critique, however, is structural rather than 
results-oriented.  I have argued that the test derived from Schaumburg lacks 
coherence, clarity, and doctrinal sustainability.  The most direct support for 
my contention is the inability of lower courts even to agree whether the 
Court‘s test is one of strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.  When 
interpreted as the former, the test is inconsistent with the application of 
content analysis in other areas of speech regulation.  When interpreted as the 
latter, Schaumburg fails to account adequately for the civic interests at stake 
with charitable speech.  My concern is the same that Robert Post has 
expressed with respect to commercial speech: 
 
Commercial speech doctrine is now almost a quarter of a 
century old.  Yet in all that time it has never systematically 
queried its own justifications and implications.  By settling 
quickly and easily into a test whose bland provisions were 
indifferent to a disciplined account of the constitutional value 
of commercial speech, the doctrine has allowed fundamental 
differences of perspective to fester and increase.  These 
differences now threaten to explode the doctrine entirely.
178
 
 
178. Post, supra note 41, at 54–55. 
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My aim has been to propose an alternative test that reflects greater clarity 
and transparency.
179
  My argument has been chiefly analytical, but it also 
contains a normative element: the Court‘s inability to establish a coherent test 
has exposed an important form of speech to an unwarranted risk of 
overregulation.  This assertion flows from my view that the protections of the 
First Amendment should be at their highest for political speech and that 
charitable solicitation is a kind of political speech.  I have thus adopted a 
broader conception of political speech than some.  But I have also argued for 
principled line-drawing that prevents an exceptional category of speech from 
being swallowed by the whole.  Thus, for example, I have contended that 
neither begging nor commercial speech warrant the same level of protection 
that should be extended to charitable solicitation.  Others might argue that 
both of those forms of speech contribute to a rich and diverse civic discourse 
as much as charitable solicitation.  These discussions need to be taking place 
with greater frequency.  Principled distinctions between different forms of 
speech, and even distinctions between speech and non-speech, have become 
increasingly thin.  To take but one obvious example, we have amply 
demonstrated that, when it comes to pornography, we haven‘t known it when 
we‘ve seen it.180 
Evolving technology will ensure that the regulation of charitable 
solicitation remains a timely legal issue,
181
 and First Amendment 
jurisprudence must be capacious enough to resolve unforeseen challenges as 
the speech interests underlying charitable solicitation continue to intersect in 
new ways with competing interests.  Left unaltered, Schaumburg‘s test may 
be incapable of meeting those challenges; indeed, it may be reduced to an 
―abstract concept‖ that becomes ―filled with whatever content and direction 
one can manage to put into [it].‖ 182 
 
179. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63 (rev. ed. 1969) (―The desideratum of 
clarity represents one of the most essential ingredients of legality.‖). 
180. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
181. See, e.g., FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 855 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding distinction between charitable and commercial solicitation under the national do-not-call 
registry); see also First Spam and Spim, Now „Spit:‟ VoIP Annoyance Defies Regulatory 
Categorization, 73 U.S. LAW WEEK, Nov. 30, 2004, at 2316 (describing ―spit‖ as ―a next-generation 
annoyance that delivers unsolicited commercial messages to users of Internet telephony‖).  
182. STANLEY FISH, THERE‘S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT‘S A GOOD THING, TOO 
102 (1994). 
